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Leadership for a Pluralistic Order? 
Assessing BRICS and 
Development Finance
MARKO JUUTINEN
Takeaways for Leading Change
The chapter discusses change on the macro level of the emerging world 
order through an analysis of BRICS development finance. It discusses 
BRICS as a new agent in global affairs, which responds to the leadership 
demands of a changing world order. Defined by pluralism and dispersion 
of power, the emerging world order necessitates a form of agency with a 
higher tolerance for difference. The focus of this chapter is on development. 
It seeks to assess BRICS agency particularly in this context through two 
competing hypotheses – BRICS as a challenger and BRICS as a constructive 
leader of change. The chapter first presents a critical perspective to 
development, then reviews scholarly perceptions and empirical evidence 
on BRICS. It concludes with a discussion on the hypotheses. Adopting 
a linear perspective to change, the chapter discusses the challenge of 
the BRICS to orthodox development finance, and sees no evidence of a 
challenge. However, the non-linear approach to change provides more 
nuanced insights into the agency and leadership role of the BRICS.
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International affairs are undergoing significant changes. On one hand, the US has lost its predominant position in global governance. While still 
powerful, it is unable to influence decisively international organisations. At 
the same time, the influence of rising powers and the long-excluded majorities 
of the Global South has increased. Because of this ensuing cacophony of 
a growingly pluralistic world order, global governance on multilateral 
level, like the World Trade Organization (WTO), has 
been crippled with international cooperation shifting 
to regional and intra-regional groupings. Consequently, 
international affairs are increasingly characterised by 
fragmentation, pluralism, and competition. 
As a new institution of intra-regional and emerging 
power cooperation, BRICS presents us with a case study 
into these transformations. Are these changes making 
the world less governable and more conflict-prone? Or 
is governance just taking new forms to better reflect 
the inherent pluralism of the world? According to 
Amitav Acharya (2016), fragmentation of governance 
does not necessarily imply the end of governability 
and cooperation. In fact, he argues that fragmentation 
and pluralism might be a means for better leadership, more creative and 
responsive to particular contexts and special needs. 
This chapter presents a case study on BRICS, founded in 2009 by Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China and joined by South Africa in 2011. The purpose 
of this chapter is to examine how this new initiative relates to global 
governance and leadership. This boils down to the question about BRICS’ 
agency: what kind of agent is it? Two competing hypotheses frame this work: 
1. BRICS is a challenger 2. BRICS is a constructive leader of change? The 
first hypothesis derives from the BRICS challenge theory, which proposes 
that BRICS seeks to challenge the current system and therefore promotes 
instability in global governance. This hypothesis defines the relation of new 
international organisations to global governance in terms of linear change. 
The alternative hypothesis is based on a non-linear understanding of 
change, a key theme explored in this book. From a non-linear perspective, 
change may be conceived of as an inherently open process more akin to 
The purpose of 
this chapter is to 
examine how the 
BRICS initiative 
relates to global 
governance and 
leadership.
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creative chaos than planned harmony. Change is not merely a reaction 
to something or a logical outcome of preceding causes. Instead, changes 
occur in contexts where input factors are uncontrollable, unknown and 
random. In an increasingly pluralistic world order, where dispersion and 
multiplication of political agency, authority and knowledge have broken 
linear continuities between them, the non-linear perspective offers a 
complementary way to understand change. Indeed, linear perspectives 
presuppose continuity where it does not necessarily exist. This makes it 
difficult to recognise changes that come, so to speak, from outside the box. 
The second hypothesis is that BRICS is a constructive force in global 
affairs. From this perspective, BRICS is a response to or reflective of the 
emerging pluralistic world order. It can be analysed as a space maker 
for new alternatives of governance, promotion of pluralism as well as 
leadership in diffused power system. The particular focus of this chapter 
is on BRICS development finance initiatives. It sheds light on BRICS’s 
relation to development both as a paradigm and practice. To the extent that 
BRICS creates space for new development practices and paradigm, and to 
the extent it takes leadership in solving development issues, it deserves the 
label of a constructive leader of change. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section discusses development 
as a paradigm applied by international financial institutions, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The second section discusses 
current debates and perceptions of BRICS and details the two hypotheses 
of the case study. The third section presents an empirical analysis of BRICS 
development finance initiatives, establishing the differences between BRICS 
institutions and the dominant multilateral financial institutions. It argues 
that while BRICS can only with difficulty be seen as a promoter of alternative 
development finance, it is nonetheless opening up a space for rethinking and 
unthinking the predominant ideas and practices of development finance. 
Problematising the Orthodoxy of Development
The concept of development means evolution in a state of being or a 
gradual rise from being underdeveloped to being developed. The concept 
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is descriptive in the sense that it refers to a process of becoming something. 
While there is no strict classification of developed countries, this group of 
countries includes the usual suspects: the US, Canada, most of Western 
and all of Northern Europe, Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, and Israel. 
All these countries are liberal democracies. According to some scholars 
(e.g., Ferguson, 2011; Fukuyama, 1992), it is the practice of free markets, 
competition and individuality that defines liberal democracies and explains 
their advancement. Liberal democracies, according to this view, have found 
the paradigm and the formula for development. In this sense, development 
can be framed as a normative concept. 
From an epistemological standpoint, development is like any other 
normative concept: it is of a fundamentally subjective nature. There is no 
God of development – seen and heard by all of humanity – who could lay 
down, explain and teach the paradigm of development. From a philosophical 
standpoint, development is a pluralist concept. While its actual form and 
substance varies from place to place, from people to people, no one can 
claim universality for their subjective ideas. Nonetheless, development 
has its high priests and armies, like most other subjective truths of 
political importance. Indeed, it was not so long ago that the Washington-
based international financial institutions (IFIs), the World Bank Group 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), dominated the politics of 
development. The orthodoxy which emerged from these institutions was 
the idea that market forces were the best mechanism for development. 
This is usually referred to as the Washington Consensus or free market 
fundamentalism (e.g., Stiglitz, 2002). 
This orthodoxy of development was based on the idea that private market 
forces were the best available mechanism for development and that the 
state of being developed was equivalent to an unfettered market economy. 
It was not merely an ideology. It was a political practice by international 
financial institutions financing development projects expected to step 
in when states need financial assistance (acting, for example, as a lender 
of last resort). In practice, the Washington Consensus meant that any 
country in need of financial help from the IMF and the World Bank had to 
commit itself to political reforms. These included privatizations of public 
property, cuts in public spending on infrastructure, education and health, 
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trade liberalisation and the deregulation of foreign exchange (Babb, 2013; 
Glinavos, 2008; Saad-Filho, 2010; Williamson, 2004).
There are several instrumental reasons for the rise of a singular 
paradigm of development above all others, two of which stand out. The 
first is the former hegemonic position of the USA, which contributed to 
the universalisation of this singular paradigm. The second is the epistemic 
foundation in mainstream economics that combines subjective preferences 
and normative values with universality. One of the leading figures in making 
this combination was the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises. According 
to Mises (1949, p. 21), the backbone of social and economic development is 
the individual choices repeated day after day in free markets and mediated 
by prices and money. For von Mises, this fundamental subjectivism of free 
markets is the foundation of scientific objectivism: instead of norms and 
values, objectivist science studies market preferences. This provides the 
only scientifically verifiable norm for a good society: liberty to choose and 
free markets. Von Mises (1949, p. 21) writes: 
[I]t is in this subjectivism that the objectivity of our science lies� Because it is 
subjectivistic and takes the value judgements of acting man as ultimate data 
not open to any further critical examination, it is itself above all schools of 
dogmatism and ethical doctrines, it is free from valuations and preconceived 
ideas and judgments, it is universally valid and absolutely and plainly human�
Sustainable use of natural resources is one of the problems of this 
perspective to development, particularly that developed countries have 
polluted the earth so that life-giving radiation from the sun does not escape 
the earth as it used to. Instead, it shines ever warmer on the plastic garbage 
islands (larger than some countries) surfing the oceanic streams, which 
are in jeopardy due to melting polar ice caps. This model of development, 
as Peruvian diplomat and author Oswaldo de Rivero (2010, p. 2–3) argues, 
“operates in the same way as a cancerous cell that goes on destroying 
the organism off which it lives.” The most ardent proponents of free 
market fundamentalism argue that the rise in our material well-being 
through the availability of cars, mobile phones, McDonalds and, most 
importantly, the decline in child mortality, are clear indications of a true 
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global development. However, economic development has been paralleled 
with ecological disaster. From the only universally applicable perspective, 
that is, the preservation of our common earth, economic development has 
also brought about a rapid degeneration of the natural environment. 
Another set of problems related to the development orthodoxy are social 
in nature. Only a minority of the global population, even in developed 
countries, enjoys economic independence, which is a key aspect of free 
market competition. Without it, market-related choices are less about 
individual preferences and more about power. Even more importantly, 
one should not forget the millions of people born to life at a subsistence 
level, without individual or communitarian control over their living 
environments and subjected to the force of hunger and the money that 
serves global markets (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018, 
p. 10–14; FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, & WHO, 2017, p. ii). 
Concern with the social effects of economic development is not new. 
It was raised by the founders of both liberalism and communism. Karl 
Marx’s (1887/2010, p. 313) critique of the English factories, where the 
worker becomes “a living appendage of the machine,” is still applicable to 
the sweatshops of Indonesia, China, India and other parts of the emerging 
and developing world. Adam Smith (1776/2005, p. 637–638) worried about 
the effects of long hours of stationary factory work on the intellectual and 
emotional abilities of workers. He wrote that the high productivity and 
economic gains for the owner may come with heavy costs for the worker, “to 
be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues.” 
It is equally questionable whether it is proper for millions of people in 
developed societies to live in poverty through both unemployment and 
minimum wage employment, while a wealthy minority acquires the 
majority of the income (Ehrenreich, 2001; Shipler, 2005). 
Thus, the problems of this old paradigm are many, and it has been 
objected to critique from academia, from developing countries as well 
as from within multilateral institutions (e.g. Rodrik, 1996; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Mendes Pereira, 2016). As a result, the international financial institutions 
have sought to better take into account problems of poverty and social 
exclusion, employing the concept of inclusive growth to describe shift 
away from the old orthodoxy (Mendes Pereira, 2016; Saad-Filho, 2010). 
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Yet, many scholars have argued that these changes do not amount to 
a change in the paradigm itself and that, in spite of some reforms, the 
Washington Consensus remains without an alternative. (Babb, 2013; 
Glinavos, 2008; Saad-Filho, 2010). 
Against this background, BRICS has elicited debates on how it relates 
to the Washington Consensus and whether BRICS offers alternatives 
to the old development paradigm (see e.g., Ban & Blyth, 2013; Gray & 
Gills, 2016; Bond & Garcia, 2015). This chapter seeks to relate BRICS to 
global governance through the international financial institutions and in 
particular through the orthodoxy of development.
BRICS: A Challenger or a Constructive Leader?
BRICS scholarship has mostly operated within linear or evolutionary 
perspectives on change. In other words, the focus has been on a potential 
rupture with the past or a gradual improvement of it. The BRICS challenge 
theory can be divided into two main hypotheses: a) that BRICS poses a 
challenge to the hierarchy between states in the current multilateral system 
or b) that it seeks to challenge the system. Challenging the hierarchy 
between states is relevant for a state-centric analysis of international 
relations, and particularly for the US and its allies (e.g., Tammen et al., 
2000). From an institutionalist perspective, international relations 
are mostly understood in terms of rules and norms, whereby decision-
making takes place in international organisations between many states 
(e.g. Ikenberry, 2001). From an institutionalist perspective, it is relevant to 
study BRICS relations in terms of the current institutions, rules and norms. 
In the global trading and financial system, BRICS has already engendered 
some changes. In response to the US dominance in international financial 
institutions, BRICS launched two new financial institutions in 2014: the 
New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA). Three BRICS members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
Brazil, India and China, played a crucial role in upsetting the former balance 
of power at the WTO by increasing the influence of the developing world 
(Hopewell, 2016). In its summit declarations, BRICS calls for a greater 
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voice for the developing world and demands democratic reforms at the 
United Nations (UN), World Bank and IMF (see Stuenkel, 2013; Thakur, 
2014). What exactly have been the effects and objectives of these changes? 
Is BRICS promoting a new kind of economic and social development and 
a new type of multilateralism, or is it simply seeking a greater level of 
influence; i.e., seeking to change the hierarchy between states? 
The BRICS are not the best promoters nor appliers of market-oriented 
regulatory systems, fiscal austerity and comprehensive trade liberalisation 
(Babb, 2013; Fourcade, 2013; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2012). They have instead 
retained varying measures of direct or indirect state control over their 
markets (Nölke, ten Brink, Simone & May, 2014; Stephen, 2014), most 
notably China (Jiang, 2014; McNally, 2012; van der Pijl, 2012). Moreover, 
in the UN, China and Russia – both members of the Security Council – have 
used their veto power in support of either their strategic interest or the 
fundamental values of national integrity. An example of this is the US-led 
humanitarian intervention in Syria and regarding the application of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) commitment (Stuenkel, 2014). 
The fact that the BRICS economies differ from liberalised Western 
economies does not, however, validate the hypothesis of systemic 
change. Internally, the BRICS countries are very different in terms of 
their economic structures implying that they have no shared economic 
vision or a challenging economic alternative to offer. Russia is heavily 
dependent on its oil and gas exports and has a poorly diversified economy. 
India has a booming services sector, but about half of its population 
survive on small-scale agriculture. There are as many poor Indians as 
there are Europeans altogether, but there are also as many rich Indians 
as there are Germans. China, however, is the most important trading 
partner of all world powers, and while many are dependent on China, 
China is dependent on only a few. Interestingly, China’s economic ties 
are much closer to the EU and the US than, for example, to India or other 
BRICS countries. Moreover, China’s economic (and military) clout in 
South Asia (India’s neighbourhood) has intensified the already deep-
seated conflicts between the two. 
BRICS has no common agenda for change. Indeed, Babb (2013) has 
shown there is no such thing as a BRICS consensus that opposes the 
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old Washington Consensus. Duggan (2015), in contrast, has argued that 
BRICS is changing the rules and norms of globalisation with a new agenda 
of global economic governance. His conclusion was based partly on the 
antipathy of BRICS towards internal reforms and partly on the discourse 
of development in BRICS Summit declarations. Nevertheless, Duggan 
does not prove the existence of an actual agenda. Instead, he simply 
demonstrates the existence of a discourse that deviates from established 
views on development. True, as Mielniczuk (2013) has argued, new or 
alternative discourses can have long-standing effects on the ideational 
construction of global governance through creation of shared purposes. 
This, however, is also not the same as an agenda nor does it necessarily 
lead to a formation of new or alternative agendas. 
The scholarly debate around BRICS does not render support for the 
BRICS challenge theory, in the sense that BRICS is actively promoting 
systemic change. In contrast, the Trump administration clearly views 
China and Russia in particular as challengers of the US-led international 
system. These states, according to this view, do not only seek to overturn 
the hierarchy between states, but also challenge the dominance of the 
liberal democracies in international affairs. The recent US National 
Security Strategy (Trump, 2017, p. 25) and the National Defence Strategy 
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2018, p. 2) declared that great power 
competition has returned and that challenger states seek “to shape a 
world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority 
over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”
It is indeed true that BRICS countries have used their position to 
challenge the US and developed country agendas at the UN and WTO. 
However, that does not mean that they would not have played by the rules. 
Disagreement is fully acceptable. Moreover, democratic decision-making 
among peers is much more difficult than managing a hierarchical system. 
Governance of the UN and WTO is today much less about hierarchy 
between states that it was during the post-Cold War unipolar moment 
(e.g., Ikenberry, 2015; Hopewell, 2016). It is much more about democratic 
decision-making among peers. Thus, governance is bound to be more 
prone to disagreement, shifting alliances and timely negotiations, but 
this is something that comes with pluralism and evidences the viability of 
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cooperation instead of its demise. BRICS has indeed underlined its support 
for global institutions and multilateralism:
We emphasize the importance of an open and inclusive world economy enabling 
all countries and peoples to share in the benefits of globalization� We remain firmly 
committed to a rules-based, transparent, non-discriminatory, open and inclusive 
multilateral trading system as embodied in the WTO (BRICS, 2017, art� 32)�
Upholding development and multilateralism, we are working together for a 
more just, equitable, fair, democratic and representative international political 
and economic order (BRICS, 2017, art� 2)�
At least within the BRICS grouping, the so-called authoritarian states, 
Russia and China, are demanding the democratization of international 
affairs. It is, however, the leading democracy in the world that flouts 
the rules: Putting its protectionist rhetoric into practice, the Trump 
Administration has imposed a unilateral 25 per cent tariff on metal imports 
– in violation of global trade rules. He has tweeted that “trade wars are 
good, and easy to win” (Rushe & Haas, 2018). It appears that the challenge 
to the multilateral system is coming from the West rather than the rest. The 
transformation from international cooperation to great power competition 
is perhaps a suitable description of how the current US administration 
relates to multilateral governance rather than how BRICS or China does. 
This situation is known as the Thucydides Trap. The expression originated 
from the fear felt by the Athenians regarding the rise of Sparta; a fear that 
contributed to the long Peloponnesian War (Zhang, 2015, pp. 176–177). 
There is insufficient evidence to confirm the BRICS challenge theory 
that BRICS poses a) a challenge to the hierarchy between the states in the 
current system or that it seeks to b) challenge the entire multilateral system. 
Hierarchies between states are constantly evolving. From the perspective 
of dominant powers wishing to retain their dominance, the rise of new 
powers poses a challenge. If, however, the rising powers are constructive 
players, willing to cooperate within established institutions, changing the 
hierarchy between states does not represent a challenge against the system. 
Thus, scholars tend to dismiss the likelihood of a systemic challenge. This 
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leaves the BRICS challenge theory poorly equipped to understand change 
because the absence of a challenge does not equal a lack of change. This 
is where the dynamic conception of change outlined in the framework 
chapter of this book comes in. 
From a dynamic perspective, changes in open systems are not necessarily 
planned from above but emanate from through multiple channels from 
below, above and from between. Changes in multilateral governance 
may thus arise from a situation where developed countries no longer 
have a dominant position. Barma et al. (2009) have suggested that while 
emerging economies may not seek to overturn multilateral institutions, 
they may be constructing new webs of interaction that sideline developed 
countries. The result of this process would be a world “without the West”. 
This interpretation builds on the idea that by increasing cooperation and 
diminishing the centrality of the US and its allies, BRICS and the rising 
powers may not actively change world order or seek to challenge its former 
hegemon, but they nevertheless do instigate some change. Instead of 
actively promoting change, transformations occur through a constantly 
intensifying cooperation. The emerging powers thus create new webs of 
interaction with new central nodes, diminishing the importance of old 
nodes. As a consequence, even if BRICS does not actively challenge the 
global system, it can nevertheless be seen as a force of change. 
Thus, a competing hypothesis to the BRICS challenge theory is that 
BRICS is a constructive force in global affairs, which promotes change by 
creating a space for alternatives. To be a constructive leader in the case 
of development finance, BRICS should fulfil the following conditions: 
1) cooperate with multilateral financial institutions, 2) develop alternatives 
to liberal development policies and 3) promote open debates and 
formulations of development policies. The following sections assess BRICS 
development finance initiatives from this perspective. 
Assessing BRICS Development Finance
The BRICS policy of development finance culminates in its two institutions, 
the NDB and CRA, both launched in 2016. The NDB was established to 
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mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects 
in BRICS and other emerging and developing countries. The CRA provides 
a financial safety net for BRICS countries through the establishment of a 
currency reserve. These tasks overlap with those of the World Bank and IMF.
Since its first summit in 2009, BRICS has demanded reforms at the 
IMF. The object of the group’s dissatisfaction were the IMF voting quotas, 
giving veto right to the US and disproportionate influence for the developed 
countries. IMF development policies was not the focal point of critique. 
BRICS did not act alone in its demands. In fact, BRICS adapted its reform 
agenda from a previous agreement among major powers reached in 2008 
(under the auspices of the G20 Summit). The US congress, however, did not 
agree to reform the voting system, which would have ended US dominance in 
the institution. Thus, at the UFA Summit in 2015, the BRICS leaders declared, 
“[w]e remain deeply disappointed with the prolonged failure by the United 
States to ratify the IMF 2010 reform package, which continues to undermine 
the credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of the IMF” (BRICS, 2015, art. 19). 
International democracy is one of the fundamental values of BRICS. 
While multilateral development finance institutions are run on the basis 
of one dollar one vote, BRICS institutions are run on a basis of one country 
one vote. In the NDB, decision-making power is equally divided between 
the five BRICS member states. Yet, while the NDB is open to all UN 
members, the principle of country voting is reserved only for the BRICS 
members. According to the founding agreement of the NDB, the voting 
power of the five original members shall not fall below 55 per cent of total 
votes, whereas the maximum voting power of any new member state shall 
not exceed seven per cent. The NDB will thus remain dominated by BRICS, 
even if its membership expands. In this regard, it is similar to the IMF 
and World Bank, where developed countries still retain disproportionate 
influence compared to their role in the global economy through the voting 
rules that reflect the past share of developed countries in global economy, 
not the current one (NDB, 2014, art. 5, 6, 8, 11; IMF, 2018). 
The NDB and CRA have the financial means to make an impact. The initial 
authorised capital of the BRICS bank and the CRA was one hundred billion 
US dollars (100,000,000,000) respectively. For comparison, the capital of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World 
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Bank Group) is 230 billion. For the IMF, the total amount of special drawing 
rights (i.e., an artificial currency instrument used by the IMF, comprised 
of a basket of important national currencies) was in 2015 approximately 
240 billion units, which converts to about 340 billion US dollars. 
Two additional factors contribute to the financial relevance of the NDB 
and CRA. First, as they are open to new members and as, for example, 
Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico have already shown interest in joining, the 
financial power of the NDB and CRA has growth potential. Moreover, 
BRICS countries are better positioned to invest in development finance, 
as their share of global savings is larger than the combined share of the US, 
the EU and Japan (ORF, 2015). How does BRICS use this financial leverage?
The purpose of the NDB is to channel funding for development 
and infrastructure projects in emerging and developing countries, 
“complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial 
institutions” (NDB, 2014, art. 1). Rather than being a challenger, the 
NDB is complementary to the World Bank and IMF. The key difference 
is that BRICS financing has been delinked from the policy reforms and 
conditions that the traditional institutions are known for. This is clearly 
stated in the NDB’s strategy:
National sovereignty is of paramount importance to NDB in its interactions 
with member countries� NDB’s mandate does not include prescribing policy, 
regulatory and institutional reforms to borrowing countries (NDB, 2017, p� 11)�
Moreover, instead of embracing an ideology of development, the 
NDB seems to invite discussions and debates on development. This is 
an important inference because it implies that the NDB may be seeking 
to distance itself from the prevailing development paradigm of the 
predominant IFIs. The NDB’s General Strategy states:
The bank will constructively engage the international community as an 
independent voice on development trends and practices� As a new institution, 
NDB has much to learn from the wealth of experience of multilateral and 
bilateral development institutions, as well as civil society and academic 
organizations (NDB, 2017, p� 11)�
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The NDB thus seems to fulfil the three conditions of a constructive 
leader of global change. Conversely, the CRA is organically linked to the 
IMF and its reform policies. The objective of the CRA is to provide a safety 
net against potential shocks in global financial markets and the possible 
resulting balance of payment problems. So far so good, but if and when 
any BRICS country or other (future) member of the CRA has to rely on 
its lending, and when this country needs more than 30% of its borrowing 
quota, it must first seek structural adjustment loans from the IMF before 
it can receive additional support from the CRA. 
It is thus possible that the CRA evidences BRICS approval of the 
prevailing ideology of economic development, which led to the so-called 
lost decade in Latin America in the 1980s and is currently causing similar 
levels of destitution in Southern European euro-countries. The lost 
decade refers to economic and social dislocation caused by privatisation, 
the dismantling of social infrastructures and soaring unemployment (see 
Bond, 2016; Stiglitz, 2002). 
From the perspective of BRICS as a challenger of liberal development 
policy, the CRA’s linkage to IMF policy reforms poses an analytical dilemma. 
This serves as an apparent contradiction between rejecting conditional 
development finance, on one hand, and being committed to structural 
adjustment, on the other. In a way, BRICS gives with one hand and takes 
with the other. A possible solution to this dilemma comes from the 
understanding of the group’s role in development finance as a space maker 
instead of as a challenger. Its rejection of conditionality does not emanate 
from a conviction that structural adjustment policies are wrong and evil, but 
from a conviction that it is not the only truth or comprehensive perspective 
on development. BRICS may thus be willing to continue to cooperate with 
the IMF, even by subjecting its members to structural adjustment, while 
simultaneously constructing development without the same conditions.
Discussion
This chapter has analysed the BRICS agency in development finance 
through the lens of two competing hypotheses (for broader discussions 
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on BRICS, see Juutinen & Käkönen, 2016a; 2016b). According to the first 
hypothesis, BRICS is a challenger, while the second posits that BRICS 
is a constructive leader for change. There is little evidence in the case 
of development finance to suggest that BRICS is a challenger of the old 
paradigm of development or of multilateral institutions of financial 
governance. There is increasing literature arguing that, instead of providing 
for alternative paradigms, BRICS development policies are of a rather 
conventional nature (Bond, 2016; Gudynas, 2016). Surely, for the future of 
global cooperation, this is good news. 
This chapter has also sought to demonstrate that BRICS development 
finance has some special characteristics. While not suitable as a challenger, 
these characteristics befit a discussion on BRICS as an opener and leader 
of innovative and constructive change. These characteristics relate to the 
ability and willingness to 1) cooperate with global financial institutions, 
2) break Western intellectual and practical dominance at the multilateral 
level or any type of singular development paradigm and 3) promote open 
debates and formulations of development policies. 
Consequently, there is space to argue that to some extent BRICS has 
made it possible to provide alternative views about development finance. 
Through its financial heft and, indeed, its new financial institutions, the 
NDB and CRA, it also demonstrates the increasing pluralism of the post-
hegemonic world order. As Acharya (2016) has argued, this pluralism does 
not necessarily pose additional threats to global cooperation. What the 
NDB and CRA can accomplish is to provide tailored development finance 
– defined on the basis of particularistic and local needs and requirements. 
As a result, the two institutions may contribute to the strengthening of 
global governance instead of its delegitimization. 
At the same time, while rejecting the ideational dominance of the 
development policies by the IMF and World Bank, BRICS welcomes 
them as one among many other agents of development. Indeed, BRICS 
demonstrably supports structural adjustment to some extent – without 
endorsing it as the only alternative or the leading principle of their own 
development finance. In addition, Patrick Bond (2016) has argued that 
BRICS is as much about resource extraction, environmental degradation 
and capitalist power asymmetries as any developed country and much more 
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than any of the Northern countries. As a result, it appears that the structural 
and ideational continuities of capitalism bind BRICS to the old. In this 
sense, BRICS is indeed not a challenger but also hardly a leader of change.
Even though it appears that BRICS is a new type of actor on the global 
stage, this interpretation thus has serious limitations. BRICS is new in the 
sense that it builds on and promotes pluralism by breaking the ideational 
predominance of the orthodoxy of development. Yet, while BRICS has 
created a space for discussion about alternative development models, 
there is little evidence of BRICS actually taking the lead in this discussion. 
Perhaps the BRICS promise is yet to materialise.
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